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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3427 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES M. FELIX, 
        Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the District of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Crim. No. 3-76-cr-00258-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Curtis V. Gómez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 26, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Since 1977, Charles M. Felix has been serving a sentence of life imprisonment 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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imposed by the District Court in its former capacity as a local court of the Virgin Islands.  
In 2009, he filed pro se the petition at issue here, which he captioned as a “motion for 
writ of habeas corpus” and supplemented with several other filings.  Felix requested 
release from prison on the ground that, although he has been eligible for parole pursuant 
to 5 V.I.C. § 4601 since 1992, he has not yet received a parole hearing. 
 The District Court properly identified Felix’s challenge as one directed to the lack 
of  parole consideration but dismissed it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  We 
vacated and remanded because the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 to review the Virgin Islands’ execution of a prisoner’s sentence, including 
the denial of parole.  See United States v. Felix, 518 F. App’x 64, 65 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citing Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 633 (3d Cir. 2000)).  We further explained that 
Virgin Islands prisoners are required to exhaust their challenges to the denial of parole in 
the territorial courts before raising their challenges under § 2241.  See id. (citing 
Callwood, 230 F.3d at 634).  Thus, we remanded for the District Court to exercise its 
jurisdiction over Felix’s petition, but we expressed no opinion on whether he had 
exhausted his challenge.  See id. 
 On remand, the District Court directed the parties to brief the issue of exhaustion.  
After they did, the District Court concluded that Felix has not exhausted his challenge 
and denied his petition on that basis.  Felix appeals.  Felix does not require a certificate of 
appealability to appeal the denial of his § 2241 petition, see Callwood, 230 F.3d at 633 
n.7, and we thus have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  We will  
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affirm. 
 A Virgin Islands habeas petitioner challenging the execution of his or her sentence  
“has the burden of proving exhaustion of all [territorial] remedies.”  Coady v. Vaughn, 
251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2001).  Felix argues that he exhausted his remedies by filing 
with the Virgin Islands Superior Court in 2008 a motion apparently captioned as a 
“motion for reconsideration and review of life and natural life under 4601 sentencing 
guidelines.”  The Government counters that Felix did not exhaust his territorial remedies 
because he failed to appeal the Superior Court’s denial of that motion to the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court and his time to do so has expired.  The District Court concluded 
that Felix failed to show exhaustion for that reason.  We agree that Felix failed to show 
exhaustion, though our analysis is somewhat different.1 
 Felix’s Superior Court motion is not of record, and we thus are unable to 
determine what claim or claims Felix actually asserted in that motion.  The Superior 
Court’s order denying that motion, by contrast, is of record and suggests that Felix did 
not raise any claim based on the denial of a parole hearing.  (ECF No. 109-4 at 1.)  From 
                                              
1 If Felix challenged the denial of parole before the Superior Court and then failed to 
timely appeal to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court as the Government argued, that 
circumstance ordinarily would mean that his claim is procedurally defaulted.  See 
Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  Felix’s procedural 
default of his claim would in turn mean that he cannot proceed with it under § 2241 
without showing cause for the default and prejudice.  See id. at 761.  Neither the 
Government nor the District Court addressed that possibility.  As we explain herein, 
however, there is no indication that Felix actually asserted a claim for the denial of parole 
before the Superior Court.   
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that order, it appears that Felix claimed only that he was sentenced to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole and that he asked the Superior Court to reconsider his 
sentence and make him eligible for parole.  As the Superior Court explained, however, 
Felix’s sentence does not render him ineligible for parole and the Virgin Islands Bureau 
of Corrections’ records indicate that Felix has been eligible for parole since March 10, 
1992.  The Superior Court further explained than any motion for reconsideration of his 
sentence should be directed to the District Court as the sentencing court.  Thus, there is 
no indication that Felix raised any claim before the Superior Court, as he did before the 
District Court, regarding the denial of a parole hearing.  And because there is no such 
indication, Felix has not met his burden of showing that he exhausted such a claim. 
 For this reason, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  The District 
Court’s ruling and ours are without prejudice to Felix’s ability to file a § 2241 petition 
with the District Court raising a parole-denial claim after he has exhausted it before the 
territorial courts.  Because Felix’s filings reflect some confusion about the proper course 
of action,2 we advise him more specifically as follows.  If Felix believes that he is entitled 
to parole or to parole consideration under territorial or federal law, then he should file a  
                                              
2 Felix asked in a motion for counsel “Who have jurisdiction of Felix’s case?  I was sent 
from Superior Court, to the District Court and back.”  (ECF No. 118.)  After the District 
Court denied Felix’s petition as unexhausted and faulted him for failing to appeal to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Felix filed his notice of appeal with the District Court but 
stated therein that he “appeals to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.”  (ECF No. 
140.)  The District Court has not addressed Felix’s motions for counsel, but we perceive 
no abuse of discretion because it does not appear that appointment of counsel in his 
federal proceeding is warranted at this time.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). 
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habeas petition with the Virgin Islands Superior Court explaining why.  See generally 
Dowling v. Lettsome, No. Civ. 363/2005, 2005 WL 3662440 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 
2005) (entertaining parole-based habeas petition); Josiah v. Farrelly, No. Civ. 827/92, 
1993 WL 13751623 (V.I. Terr. Ct. June 15, 1993) (same).  If Felix receives an 
unfavorable ruling, then he may appeal to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  Only if 
Felix properly appeals to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court and receives an unfavorable 
ruling from that court as well may he file a § 2241 petition with the District Court 
challenging the denial of parole.  And, as we previously advised Felix, relief under § 
2241 is available only if the denial of parole or parole consideration constitutes a 
violation of federal law.  See Felix, 518 F. App’x at 65 (citing Callwood, 230 F.3d at 634 
n.8).  We express no opinion on the merits of any claim that Felix may assert in this 
regard.3 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3 If Felix actually asserted a parole-denial claim before the Superior Court in 2008, and if 
the territorial courts reject any future claim he may raise for that reason, then the issue of 
procedural default noted above can be addressed on the basis of a more complete record 
if Felix files another § 2241 petition in the future. 
 
